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LICENSING IN THE EASTERN BLOC
Lajos Schmidt*
This article will discuss the legal problems faced by American
enterprises desiring to license industrial property rightsprincipally patents, trademarks and know-how-in Eastern
Europe. Licensing in seven countries-the Soviet Union, Poland,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, the German Democratic
Republic (East Germany) and Bulgaria-will be examined.'
Of course, these countries form separate and independent legal
and political jurisdictions; and even their cultural backgrounds
differ. Any generalization about them must be taken in that context. Nonetheless, each of these countries is governed by similar
political and economic principles-in particular, the principle of
centralized economic planning. These common factors are reflected in common problems faced by Western licensors, and their
attorneys, in dealing with their counterparts in each of the countries in the Eastern bloc.
The legal problems of industrial property licensing must be
viewed in the proper socio-economic context as well as within the
context of the legal system of each Eastern European nation.
Therefore, a brief discussion of the current Eastern European
"context" may be useful to the reader before an analysis of the
*

Partner, Baker and McKenzie, Chicago. LL.B., 1941, Peter Pazmany Uni-

versity, Budapest; Ph.D., 1942, University of Munich; D.J., 1943, St. Elizabeth
University, Pecs, Hungary; J.D., 1954, Chicago-Kent College of Law.

1. These countries are the "active" members of the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance, sometimes referred to as COMECON or COMECON
member countries. Although Albania is generally counted among the Eastern bloc
countries, it is not an active member of COMECON and has no present economic
significance to United States licensors. The author is unaware of any license
agreements existing between any Western enterprises and Albania.
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legal problems of licensing, as reflected in the drafting of licensing
agreements, is considered.
I.

THE CLIMATE FOR LICENSING IN EASTERN EUROPE

A.

Interest in Western Technology

The technical achievements of Russian scientists in space exploration and other areas might indicate that there are few fields in
which Western European and United States technology is more
advanced than the state of art in the socialist countries. Nonetheless, in spite of these advances, Eastern European nations need
and seek Western technology; and the United States, with its research and development ability, manufacturing know-how and
abundance and quality of manufactured goods, is considered the
leader in most fields of technology and industry. Even in fields of
industry that might be considered rather mundane in the West, an
eagerness exists on the part of Eastern enterprises to obtain licenses. For example, Swiss Vogelsang A.G. recently licensed the
Czech Barvy a Laky Company to manufacture automobile lac2
quers.
The reason for these demands for Western licenses despite Eastern European technological advances is complex, but a major factor seems to be the Eastern European tendency to segregate research and development from industry. Until recently, research
and development efforts were carried on in "think tanks" that were
under the control of different ministries than were production enterprises, and that were segregated physically from the factories.
Much basic research was carried on by scientists concentrated in
these institutions and there is a great wealth of basic discoveries
made in the Eastern European nations. According to a 1965 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development study, Russia
employed more graduate engineers in research and development
than did the United States. This great research effort may be
attributable to the Marxist-Leninist tenet that economic improvement follows the development of science and technology. The successful selling of goods supposedly commences with fundamental
research through development followed by marketing and therefore increases the standard of living of the masses. There exists,
however, a wide gap between research and development carried
out in the abstract and its translation into day-to-day use through
2.

1 E. EUROPE REP. 52 (1972).
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manufacturing.
The 1970 statistics published by the Soviet Chamber of Commerce on Czechoslovakia's balance of license proceeds and expenditures further indicate this concentration on basic research and
development. Thirty-three per cent of Czechoslovakia's receipts
from Western licensees were generated by basic research carried on
by the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences and Technical Universities; thirty-four per cent were attributable to chemical and pharmaceutical licenses and twenty-seven per cent to the textile,
machinery and leather working industry. This Czech technology
flows principally to West German, United States and Japanese
licensees.
On the other hand, Czechoslovakia pays four times more license
fees to the West than it receives, principally, in descending order
of importance, to France, West Germany and the United Kingdom. Forty-eight per cent of all fees paid originate from the engineering industry; twenty per cent from the chemical industry; thirteen per cent from consumer goods; nine per cent from the mining,
iron and steel industry; and six per cent are attributable to the
construction industry. Recently published figures indicate that
Western licensors are extending licenses to Eastern licensees at an
3
accelerating pace.
There is evidence that several Eastern European countries are
gradually eliminating the segregation between research and development and the manufacturing enterprises. In 1970, Izvestia mentioned the establishment of Pozitron of Leningrad as the first link
between research and industry. This organization comprises a
leading research laboratory, a machine tool development and design bureau and two substantial manufacturing enterprises. In
Romania, Centrala Industriala (Industry Centers) were formed by
180 individual associations. The purpose of the Industry Centers
is to coordinate entire fields of industry starting with research,
through development, to manufacturing. These Industry Centers
represent a self-contained unit, similar to large United States corporations. However, until these concepts are widely adopted, and
probably even thereafter, the need for practical Western technology in Eastern Europe will continue to be enormous.
3.
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B. COMECON
In addition to centralized planning at the national level, there
have been repeated attempts, primarily at the instigation of the
Soviet Union, to institute centralized economic planning at the
Eastern European level within the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (COMECON). At the July 1971 COMECON meeting
in Bucharest the following goals were established: (1) to increase
labor productivity; (2) to secure to the member states a more competitive position in world markets; and (3) to pool work in advancing science and technology. Even though we read of attempts to
increase cooperation among COMECON member nations, as in
the field of computer development (and this was clearly the intention of the third goal), several Eastern European nations have
endeavored to implement the foregoing resolutions by seeking access to the most advanced technology and production methods,
which, in their opinion, are available in the West, principally in
the United States. This has meant that enterprises in different
COMECON countries have competed with each other to obtain
licenses, a very favorable development from the Western point of
view. There are indications that this situation may change, however. For the last few years, the leaders of the Soviet Union have
endeavored to coordinate more closely the economic activities of
the COMECON member countries. At a recent informal discussion held by Party Chief Leonid Brezhnev, the leaders of the COMECON member countries decided to inaugurate immediately
the coordination of each country's 1976-1980 five-year plan and to
have those plans available for review at the beginning of 1974. This
early review of the five-year plans will facilitate the allocation of
production goals and resources among the member countries
thereby eliminating the parallel manufacturing of the same or similar products.
There remains some doubt whether all COMECON members
will be willing to accept the economic role assigned to them and
to specialize thereafter in the designated fields of economic endeavor. During the last decade, Romania has refused to be relegated to the position of an agricultural producer and raw material
supplier and, since that time, has achieved great progress toward
industrialization. The benefits that Romania derived from the independent attitude of its leaders will not be lost on the other COMECON countries.
The Soviets reportedly may be able to achieve the allocation of
primary production responsibilities among the COMECON memWinter, 1973
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ber countries indirectly even if its current attempt to do so directly
should fail. The 27th COMECON Council meeting held in Prague
in June 1973 called for the "further development of mutually advantageous economic, scientific and technical relations between
states with different social and economic systems, especially in
Europe." Should a strong working relationship develop between
the COMECON and the European Economic Community, a
means of channeling Western technology to the country designated
by the COMECON as the primary producer of particular goods or
machinery may develop. Should the COMECON, directly or indirectly, succeed in allocating responsibility for the development of
certain industries among its member states, Western licensors
would find themselves with but a single potential licensee.
C. Nature of the Licensees
1. Foreign Trade Organizations.-As noted above, common
characteristics of the countries in Eastern Europe are their centrally planned economies and their nationally monopolized foreign
trade. Typically, obtaining licenses from abroad or extending licenses to foreign parties falls within the competence of a foreign
trade organization established by the state. For example, a Western licensor wishing to extend a license or to obtain a license in
Eastern Europe would enter into a contract with the foreign trade
office of the appropriate country-in the case of the Soviet Union,
with V/O Licensintorg; in Poland, with Polservice; in Czechoslovakia, with Polytechna; in Hungary, with Licencia; and in Bulgaria,
with Technika. In Romania, the authority of the previous central
licensing organization, Industrialimport, has been decentralized
recently as described below.
2. Individual Enterprises.-InJanuary 1968, Hungary introduced an experimental program labeled the "New Economic
Mechanism." This program gave individual enterprises a greater
independent responsibility in complying with the overall production goals established by the central planning authorities. In order
to enable enterprises to comply with these production goals, some
were given the right to enter into transactions with foreigners,
including the right to purchase and sell machinery and equipment.
Since technology most often enters the Eastern bloc countries as
an essential part of a transaction for the purchase of machinery,
equipment and even entire plants, the New Economic Mechanism
gave a substantially larger number of Hungarian enterprises access
to Western technology than the strict central planning previously
utilized had provided; the New Economic Mechanism also afforded foreign companies relatively free access to potential HunVol. 7-No. 1
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garian licensees. On the other hand, freer access to Western
machinery, equipment and technology carried with it a correspondingly greater responsibility on the part of the individual enterprises to generate convertible currency to fund the purchase of
goods and technology. If an enterprise exceeds its export goals,
then, as a further inducement, a portion of the excess earnings can
be retained for additional purchases in the West.
In Romania, a similar decentralization program accompanied
the establishment of Centrala Industriala. Instead of Industrialimport, the previous single foreign trade organization responsible for
purchase of foreign licenses, the newly established Industry Centers have been authorized to acquire licenses from abroad or extend them to the foreign enterprises. Each Industry Center may
have its own foreign trade department, responsible solely to that
Industry Center, allowing the Center to contract directly with foreigners for the purchase and sale of goods and technology. The
Industry Center's foreign trade department obviously can discuss
license arrangements with a foreign licensor in a different manner
and with a different understanding of the technical and commercial problems involved than a state foreign trade organization.
Foreign trade organizations are not only likely to be less knowledgeable about the particular art in question, but they also are
normally responsible to a different ministry than the enterprise for
which they are presumably acting-a source of innumerable delays
and difficulties. The establishment of the Centrala Industriala
therefore secures a more direct approach to potential licensees.
Poland has brought, or is in the process of bringing, all enterprises
into closely knit industry groups. The legal existence of the group
members will be preserved, but their research and development,
purchasing, sales and international trading activities will be
closely coordinated, resulting in increased efficiency.
3. Limitations on the Independence of Enterprises.-Inrigidly
planned economies like the Soviet Union, the status of the foreign
trade office as intermediary between licensor and licensee will be
unavoidable since that status preserves the dominant, monopolistic role of the office. Even in Hungary and Romania, there are
limitations on the ability of individual enterprises to negotiate on
their own behalf. For example, in the case of a pure license, a
Western licensor, despite the creation of the New Economic Mechanism, must negotiate with a special licensing foreign trade organization. More importantly, all Eastern European countries experience a shortage of convertible currency and, therefore, must carefully consider the wisdom of expending the limited amount of
available foreign currency on licenses. Even if an enterprise and its
Winter, 1973
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relevant ministry conclude that this expenditure would be desirable, supervisory authorities will determine whether the payment
of license fees in convertible currency should be allowed. This is
the reason for the recurring effort on the part of Eastern European
licensees to generate, in one way or another, convertible currency
or to pay license fees in kind, a point to which we shall return in
the second part of this article.
D.

The Negotiating Process

The shortage of convertible currency means that a foreign license is of fundamental importance to an Eastern European licensee. A Western team negotiating a contract typically will encounter substantial delays in finalizing the agreement. Very often,
members of the Western team are at a loss to understand the
reason for the delay, since everything that could be explained has
already been explained, the terms reasonably well worked out and
the technology understood by the technical representatives of the
Eastern team. One reason for these delays, if not the principal one,
is the desire of the Eastern team to know more intimately the
licensing entity, its status in the particular field of technology, its
likely future progress, and the compatibility of the persons and
personalities involved on the Western side with those of the future
licensee. In addition, Eastern Europeans demonstrate a great propensity to collect data and information only per tangentem related
to the proposed license but which will prove the diligence and care
with which such an important endeavor is handled on the part of
the Eastern team.
It is the author's impression that the conclusion of a license
agreement between a Western licensor and an Eastern European
licensee depends to a greater extent on the subjective judgment
formed by the Eastern European team about the Western company and its representatives, and their understanding and flexibility, than would be the case with a license agreement between two
Western parties. It is therefore of great importance that the Western team have a thorough understanding of the Eastern European
mentality, the economic system and the limitations on the contracting enterprise within that economic system. The Western
team must also display considerable flexibility and inventiveness
in solving problems as they arise.

Vol. 7-No. 1
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E. Eastern EuropeanLegal Systems
1. In General.-The 1957 Declaration of Twelve Communist
Parties in Power' emphasized the substance rather than the form
of the law and described the goals to be achieved by the law:
Guidance of the working masses by the working class, the core of
which is the Marxist-Leninist party, in effecting a proletarian revolution in one form or another and establishing one form or another
of the dictatorship of the working class; the abolition of capitalist
ownership and the establishment of public ownership of the basic
means of production; gradual Socialist reconstruction of agriculture; planned development of the national economy aimed at building socialism and communism, at raising the standards of living of
the working people; the carrying out of the Socialist revolution in
the sphere of ideology and culture and the creation of numerous
intelligentsia devoted to the working class, the working people and
the cause of socialism; the abolition of national oppression and the
establishment of equality and fraternal friendship between the peoples; defense of the achievements of socialism against attacks by
external and internal enemies; solidarity of the working class of the
country in question with the working class of other countries; that
is, proletarian internationalism.'
Such attempts to tie law to ideology have had a greater impact in
the theoretical than in the practical sphere and attorneys representing Western licensors in negotiating industrial property licenses in Eastern Europe will find themselves in reasonably familiar
territory, at least if they have some prior experience with Continental legal systems.
The 1922 Russian Civil Code was based on a marketplace economic model, and the Code retained many pre-Revolution provisions regulating contracts and their enforcement; most of these
provisions were derived from Roman law. Later legislation in the
area of contract law reflects the 1922 Civil Code but efforts were
made to distinguish between contracts between individuals in
their restricted sphere of action, between state enterprises and
individuals, and between state enterprises. The question of
whether different rules and concepts should govern legal transactions between individuals, between state enterprises and individuals, and between state enterprises was resolved by Alexei N. Kosygin in 19617 in favor of the uniform handling of all legal transac4. Declaration of the Twelve Communist Parties in Power, in THE NEW COMMANIFESTO 169, 176 (D. Jacobs 3d rev. ed. 1961).
5. See J. HAZARD, COMMUNISTS AND THEIR LAW 6 (1969).
6. Id. at 313.
7. Id. At the time, Kosygin was a colleague of Chairman Khruschev. Kosygin
became chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union in 1964.
MUNIST
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tions regardless of the identity of the contracting parties.8 The civil
codes of the other Eastern European countries also reflect their
Roman law backgrounds. All follow the Russian lead in subjecting
contracts and other commercial transactions between individuals
and state enterprises to a uniform set of legal rules.
2. Patent and Trademark Laws.-Each country belonging to
the Eastern bloc has its own patent and trademark laws. Some of
the following comments are based on the development of the patent and trademark laws of Hungary since the author is more familiar with that jurisdiction, and since the Hungarian legal developments appear somewhat representative of the legal developments
in other Eastern European countries. The first Hungarian Patent
Law was enacted in 1895 and remained in force, with various
amendments, until 1969. The new Hungarian Patent Law became
effective on January 1, 1970.10
Indicative of the number of patent applications filed in an Eastern European jurisdiction is the Hungarian experience; in 1969,
approximately 3,500 patents were applied for in Hungary-fiftyfive per cent by foreign applicants." The percentage of foreign
applications increased to sixty-three per cent in 1971, while the
total number of applications decreased by about six per cent.1 2 The
United States was the source of thirteen per cent of the applications, trailing the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany and Switzerland. 3 Forty-two percent of all patents granted in 1969 and 1971 were chemical or metallurgical in
character; 4 the greatest number of patents were filed in the
pharmaceutical-chemical field. Principal companies filing patent
applications in this field included Hoffman-LaRoche, Geigy and
CIBA (Switzerland), Hoechst (West Germany), Sumitomo
(Japan), ICI (United Kingdom) and Bayer (West Germany). The
COMECON member nations have designated Hungary as the primary developer and manufacturer of certain chemical compounds,
drugs and pharmaceuticals. This is the primary reason for the very
substantial number of patent applications filed in Hungary in the
pharmaceutical-chemical field.
8. Id. at 313-14.
9. Law No. XXXVII/1895.
10. Patent Law of April 26, 1969, 30 MAGYAR KOZLONY (official Hungarian
Gazette) 279 et seq.
11. See 9 INDUS. PROP. 1, 2 (Annex to No. 12, Dec. 1970).
12. See 11 INDUS. PROP. 1, 2 (Annex to No. 12, Dec. 1972).
13. See 9 INDUS. PROP. 1, 4-5 (Annex to No. 12, Dec. 1970).
14. Id. at 11. See also 11 INDUS. PROP. 1, 14-15 (Annex to No. 12, Dec. 1972).
Vol. 7-No. 1
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A legal device widely employed in certain Eastern European
countries for the protection of inventions is the Certificate of Inventorship (also referred to as Inventor's Certificate or Certificate
of Authorship). This device originated in the Soviet Union in 1959
within the Statute on Discoveries, Inventions and Innovation Proposals.' 5 Under this statutory system, an inventor employed by a
state enterprise refers his "innovation" to the innovation officer or
factory patent engineer who, in turn, assists the inventor in filing
an application for a Certificate of Inventorship. 1 In return for certain royalties determined according to a schedule established by
law, the state becomes the owner of the invention.' 7 In theory, a
free inventor who develops his invention without use of stateowned facilities applies for patent rights in his own name and for
his own benefit, but in practice, this occurs only in the rarest of
instances since all or nearly all productive-age persons are employed by the state, and all laboratories and other research institutions are owned by the state.
A foreign inventor may enjoy the same rights granted to Soviet
citizens by applying for an Inventor's Certificate, thereby seeking
only recognition of his authorship and granting to the state the
exclusive exploitation of the invention. 8 He would then be entitled
to the economic benefits accruing to Soviet inventors but, however
valuable these may seem to be, they are likely to be of little practical value to a foreigner.' 9 Therefore, a foreign inventor is likely to
prefer to apply for a patent recognizing his exclusive rights to
exploit the invention in addition to a certification confirming his
authorship; a foreign inventor thus maintains a relatively free
hand in negotiating licensing agreements. Furthermore, a patent
establishes a legal base for the protection of licensed products
against imports. Available comparative statistics on applications
15. Law of April 24, 1959, Statute on Discoveries, Inventions and Innovation
Proposals § 6 (Decree of Council of Ministers No. 435, U.S.S.R.), in [1959]
COLLECTED ENACTMENTS OF THE USSR, No. 9. See also Law of Dec. 8, 1961, Principles of Civil Legislation of the USSR and the Union Republics arts. 110-16,
[1961] 50 Ved. Verkh. Soy. S.S.S.R. (Supreme Soviet U.S.S.R.).
16. See J. HAZARD, supra note 5, at 248.
17. Soviet Patent Law 49, in I. GRAVE, SOVJgrlSCHES PATENTRECHT 11 (1966)
and Rodite, PatentProtectionin the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe, 1 THE AMERIcAN REVIEW OF EAST-WEST TRADE 12 (1968).
18. Law of April 24, 1959, Statute on Discoveries, Inventions and Innovation
Proposals § 6 (Decree of Council of Ministers No. 435, U.S.S.R.), in [1959]
COLLECTED ENACTMENTS OF THE USSR, No. 9.
19. Beier, Traditionaland Socialist Concepts of ProtectingInventions, 1 INT'L
REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 328, 335 (1970).
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for inventor's certificates and patents filed in the Soviet Union
bear out this contention."0
All Eastern bloc countries are members of the Paris Convention
of March 20, 1883, which secures to all subjects of each Convention
country in all other Convention countries the same patent protection and advantages granted to nationals of these countries. The
last of the COMECON member countries to become a Convention
member was the Soviet Union, with membership commencing on
July 1, 1965. The other Eastern European countries had acceded
to the Paris Convention several decades earlier." Interestingly
enough, all countries except Poland adhere to the Amendment of
Stockholm of 1967, granting to applications for Certificates of Inventorship (or "Authorship") the same claim of priority that is
applications. 2 Poland is bound by the 1925
accorded to patent
23
Hague Revision.

As renewed efforts are made on the part of the Soviet Union and
some other Eastern European countries to extend licenses, it is of
increasing importance for a prospective Western licensee to determine whether the filing date for a Certificate of Inventorship in the
Eastern country will be recognized for priority purposes in the
jurisdictions where the licensee wishes to obtain a patent grant for
the Eastern invention. In countries that are parties to the Stockholm Agreement of 1967, applications for Certificates of Inventorship receive priority status equal to patent applications. In states
not adhering to the Stockholm Agreement (like the United States),
the priority of the certificate is undetermined.
In the last few years, more emphasis has been placed in Eastern
Europe on consumer goods, and a freer flow of ideas and consumer
goods from the West to the East exists. Also, a substantial number
of Eastern visitors are traveling to the West and vice versa. Therefore, trademarks have gained increasing importance in Eastern
20.

See Blair, Inventions in the Soviet Union, 7

21.

For the text of the Paris Convention see

INT'L

LAW. 485, 487 (1973).

WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

ORGANIZATION AND UNITED INTERNATIONAL BUREAU FOR THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 1 MANUAL OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (Paris Union) § Z, at

1-3 (1971) [hereinafter cited as

INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY RIGHTS].

Bulgaria acceded

to the Convention on June 13, 1921; Czechoslovakia, on October 5, 1919; the
German Democratic Republic, on May 1, 1903; Hungary, on January 1, 1909;
Poland, on November 10, 1919; and Romania, on October 6, 1920.
22. For the text of the Amendment of Stockholm see INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS, supra note 21, § A2, at 1 (1971).
23. For the text of the 1925 Hague Revision see INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY RIGHTS,
supra note 21, § D3, at 1-2 (1965).
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Europe. Several Eastern European countries, among them the
Soviet Union, now recognize the value of advertising-a development that is likely to increase further the importance of Western
trademarks and trade names. The author's colleagues in the trademark area have recently noted a substantial increase in new trademark applications in several Eastern jurisdictions. In that connection, and interestingly, in 1968, 23224 and in 1969, 16125 United
States-owned trademarks were registered or renewed in Hungary.
Four Eastern European countries (Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary and Romania) are members of the Madrid Arrangement of April 14, 1891, for the International Registration of Marks.26 All four countries are bound by the Act of
Stockholm.Y
II.

PARTICULAR PROVISIONS OF A LICENSE AGREEMENT

A.

Parties-LegalCapacity to Act

As noted above, the nature and number of potential licensees
have been broadened in several Eastern European countries because of the greater autonomy enjoyed by individual industrial
enterprises in entering into contracts (including technology agreements) with foreigners. It is recommended that in each case the
Western licensor verify the legal capacity of the Eastern party to
enter into the particular transaction. In addition, one must also
ascertain whether the person or persons executing the agreement
are entitled to bind the enterprise. In the case of contracts of major
importance, the licensor can discover the identity of the persons
who can contractually bind the enterprise either by obtaining an
excerpt from the Companies Register where the name and title of
the persons entitled to bind the entity are recorded or by securing
a certificate from the appropriate Industrial Center or Ministry.
24.
25.

8 INDUS. PROP. 18-19 (Annex to No. 12, Dec. 1969).
9 INDUS. PROP. 18-19 (Annex to No. 12, Dec. 1970).
26. For the text of the Madrid Arrangement see INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY RIGHTS,
supra note 21, § Z [Marks], at 1 (1971). Czechoslovakia acceded to the Arrangement on October 5, 1919; the German Democratic Republic, on December 1, 1922;
Hungary, on January 1, 1909; and Romania, on October 6, 1920. Certain states
disagree on the membership of the German Democratic Republic, but the recent
diplomatic recognition and United Nations membership of this country will remove the obstacles for full membership recognition.
27. The Act of Stockholm was promulgated July 14, 1967. See generally J.
LIGHTMAN, EASTERN EUROPEAN TRADEMARK SYSTEMS AND EAST-WEsT TRADE 455
(1967).
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B. Patent and Know-How to be Licensed-Aversion to
PurePatent Licenses
At the present time, few Western inventions are protected by
patents in Eastern Europe, although this is likely to change as the
economic importance of Eastern Europe increases. In the case of a
registered patent, there is no impediment to the patent owner's
extending a naked patent license, but the author has no personal
knowledge of a grant of a patent license without the concomitant
know-how; usually the manufacturing technology also accompanies the license. Many Eastern European companies harbor the
suspicion that the right to a patent license, which is the equivalent
of a covenant not to sue, is a capitalist invention and should not
command a high price. On the other hand, they are eager to obtain
a patent license coupled with know-how and manufacturing technique, but the real interest is in the know-how and manufacturing
technique. The patent license is considered only incidental.
C. Exclusive versus Nonexclusive Licensing
1. In Licensee's Jurisdiction.-In the author's experience,
Eastern European licensees seek an exclusive license to manufacture, use and sell in their own jurisdiction. Considering the economic system prevailing in Eastern Europe, a Western licensor will
lose nothing by going along with the requested exclusivity, especially since this may also enable the licensor to obtain capital gains
treatment for the consideration paid under the license agreement.
2. The Right to Export Licensed Products.-Western licensors
must exercise caution when granting exclusive licenses covering
the entire Eastern European bloc since, in many instances, the
proposed licensee may not be the ideal vehicle through which to
reach a potential market of 350 million persons. A hasty decision
may prevent the licensing of another Eastern European company
that may prove necessary in order to satisfy completely the demand for the licensed products. On the other hand, when the licensed product has only a limited application, and if the potential
licensee is located in a jurisdiction designated by COMECON to
develop the particular branch of industry, if the licensee has a
demonstrated manufacturing ability, and if the payment provisions are sufficiently attractive, a licensor should consider extending exclusive manufacturing and, possibly, sales rights covering all
Eastern European countries.
Generally, Western licensors will endeavor to limit the sales terVol. 7-No. 1
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ritory of the Eastern European licensee to the other COMECON
member states. As mentioned above, Eastern European licensees
are short of the convertible currency necessary for the payment of
royalties. More often than not, licensees in Eastern bloc nations
will also have a limited amount of convertible currency for the
acquisition of the modern machinery and equipment necessary for
the efficient exploitation of the licensed technology. Under these
circumstances, enterprises will often seek, sometimes quite forcefully, the right to export directly, or indirectly through the licensor,
to jurisdictions where they can earn sufficient convertible currency
to fund license fees and the cost of machinery, equipment and
replacement parts.
In the author's experience, all export rights and limitations
granted to Eastern European licensees are respected by the licensees regardless whether direct sales rights or indirect sales rights
are provided for in the particular contract. When the license includes highly technical products requiring substantial service and
spare parts support, Eastern European licensees are likely to prefer
to use the marketing and service channels of the licensor for the
sale of the licensed products in designated jurisdictions or a specified part of the world, retaining to themselves only the sales and
service rights in the COMECON countries.
A word of caution is justified about certain restrictions appearing in many East-West licensing agreements. The Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice recently indicated
its intention to scrutinize East-West licensing agreements to ascertain whether they contain restrictions that cause a loss of export
opportunities to American firms or impede American importers
from securing products.2
D. Inclusion of Trademark Licenses
Although trademarks have not yet been important in East-West
licensing, it is the author's opinion that the increasing importance
of consumer demand and consumer products in Eastern Europe,
as discussed above, will mean that Western trademarks and trade
names will attain an increased importance in Eastern European
countries and will become sought-after industrial property rights.
28. See Letter from Keith I. Clearwaters, Special Assistant to the Attorney
General, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, to Dr. T. Keith Glennan,
Department of State, in BNA

PATENT, TRADEM'K

&

COPYR'T

J., No. 149 at A-17

(Oct. 18, 1973).
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Accompanied by know-how and manufacturing technology, trademarks are likely to form an attractive licensing package. To appreciate the trend toward the inclusion of trademark rights in licensing agreements one need only look at the great popularity of CocaCola and Pepsi Cola in Eastern Europe, increasing the number of
countries where the thirst of the masses is quenched by an American cola.
E. Provisions for Protectionof Secrecy
Since Eastern European licensees are primarily interested in
know-how and manufacturing technology, a license agreement
must explicitly provide, in the clearest possible language, for the
confidential treatment of that technology. By allowing Eastern
European technicians and engineers to visit Western plants and by
revealing to Eastern European licensees the lifeblood of the Western licensor-its sought-after know-how and manufacturing technology-the circle of persons having this previously confidential
information will undoubtedly be enlarged. This is, of course, also
true with licensing agreements between Western licensors and licensees, and, judging from the proliferation of these agreements,
not much harm has ensued from this exchange of ideas. In the
author's opinion, the risk of a breach of confidentiality by an Eastern European licensee is substantially less than a breach by a
Western licensee. This apparent anomaly may be explained in part
by the existence of legislation in most if not all socialist countries
prohibiting the revelation of technical knowledge acquired by a
person in the course of his employment, a prohibition sanctioned
by imprisonment. If the agreement so provides, a Hungarian licensee, for example, will obtain from each employee having access to
the licensor's technology a written confirmation that he will not
reveal the technology to any unauthorized person and that he is
cognizant of the legal provisions punishing infringement by imprisonment. (The written confirmation represents a stronger undertaking than written statements of nondisclosure made by employees
of Western licensees).
An additional problem for Western licensors is confining confidential information to the licensed company in an economic system in which all enterprises are owned by the state. Notwithstanding this common ownership, enterprises maintain independence
and guard their manufacturing secrets more stringently than do
firms in the West. Access to factories is far more restricted in the
East than it is in the West. If a Western licensor feels that excluding unauthorized persons from the licensee's premises will help
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preserve the confidentiality of his technology, the licensee will
likely be prepared to limit access to its operations. Again, the
wording and the enforcement of the undertaking can and will be
more forceful in the Eastern European countries than they would
be in the West.
A related question involves the possible delivery of the Western
know-how and manufacturing secrets to other COMECON member countries by the licensee state itself. Experience indicates that
this has not yet occurred and is even less likely to occur in the
future. The 1964 agreement between the United States and Romania is noteworthy; in that agreement Romania undertook not to
reveal American technology to any other country. Of course, in the
event that a United States export license is needed for the exportation of certain technology, then the export license will provide that
the technology may be exported only to a particular Eastern European licensee and may not be passed on without United States
Government authorization. Since the prospective licensee must
state officially to the Office of Export Control of the United States
Department of Commerce the use and the user of the technology
the licensor will be additionally safeguarded. Past experience indicates (and the author believes) that Eastern European licensees
and their governments will abide by a properly phrased contractual provision requiring secrecy of the know-how and technology
and will not reveal that information to another COMECON member country. In addition to the business (i.e. competitive) importance of such a provision, the existence of sufficient legal safeguards
maintaining trade secrets and confidential treatment of know-how
is a key element in determining that an exclusive license covering
an entire country involves the grant of a "property" right, thereby
entitling the grantor to capital gains tax treatment of the proceeds
obtained from an Eastern European licensee."
F.

ConsiderationPayable

1. Amount.-The license fee to be paid is, of course, one of the
most important points to be determined in the negotiations and it
is of great importance to both parties that a proper consideration
be agreed on. There are several ways in which license fees may be
determined.
(a) Fixed.-In the past, Eastern European companies as29. See Rev. Rul. 64-56, 1964-1 Cum. BuLL. 133-34. See also Rev. Proc. 69-19
§ 3.02(a), 1969-2 CUM. BuLL. 301, 302.
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serted that it would be impossible under their economic system to
reveal production figures, and wished, therefore to stipulate the
license payment as a fixed sum rather than paying percentages of
production totals. This fixed payment might be paid either in one
lump sum or in several installments. Of late, Eastern European
licensees have been less likely to make this assertion since the
disclosure of the units produced by the licensee has been seen less
and less as a state secret. From the point of view of the licensor,
provisions for payment of a fixed amount eliminates some of the
vagaries of planned economies. On the negative side, the potentially greater rewards to the licensor, in case of a greater-thanprojected success by the venture, is also eliminated.
(b) Percentage.-Under the New Economic Mechanism, introduced by Hungary and now practiced in other COMECON
countries as well, enterprises are increasingly forced to price their
goods based on economic factors. Nonetheless, true market pricing
may not be achieved in the near future and, therefore, if it is the
Western licensor's desire to obtain a percentage license fee based
on the sales price, an "objective" basis on which to calculate the
percentage fee should be chosen. For example, the sales price
charged by the Western licensor, reflected in its published list
price, less its customary discount (or a similar formula) should be
adopted rather than a percentage of the sales price actually set by
the Eastern licensee. It seems to be increasingly feasible to provide
in license agreements for a neutral review of the accounts of the
licensee to control proper payment of the stipulated license fee.
(c) Maximum-Minimum.-In the course of negotiations,
there can be wide differences of opinion between licensor and licensee about the quantity likely to be produced and the term during
which the particular technology may be exploited. Providing for
minimum payments with a limitation of the total amount to be
paid may be an expedient solution to this difficult question.
2. Payments in Kind.-The convertible currency shortage discussed above will encourage Eastern European licensees to request
that payment of license fees be made in kind. It is understandable
that a Western licensor would prefer to obtain United States dollars, or another convertible currency, instead of the licensed products or parts thereof in consideration for the licensed technology.
However, many Western European licensors, especially West Germans, derive an increased return from their Eastern European
licenses by accepting, at favorable prices, delivery of parts or subassemblies of the licensed products. This arrangement, in turn,
allows the Eastern licensee to manufacture the licensed items in
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greater amounts with modern production methods. The license
may acquire thereby sufficient foreign exchange to buy from the
licensor parts or subassemblies, resulting in greater benefits of
scale to both parties. One American licensor of diesel engines has
undertaken to purchase parts from the licensee in the amount of
the license fees paid plus the finished parts purchased from the
licensor, provided the quality and the terms of sale offered by the
licensee are as favorable as those offered by the licensor's other
suppliers.
G. Duration and Termination
1. Preference for Relatively Short Term.-As indicated previously, there are few Western patents registered in Eastern European countries. Therefore, the term of a license agreement does not
necessarily extend through the life of the patent, and is more likely
to be arbitrarily set at a term of five to ten years, coinciding with
the expected life of the secret technology. Since the amount of
foreign currency needed for the payment of license fees over the
entire life of the contract is of pressing importance to the Eastern
licensee, it is understandable that an Eastern licensee generally
wishes to limit the term for which payment for the Western technology is due. Skeptics in the licensee's organization may think it
is unlikely that the licensor can come up with new technology and
thereby deserve continued payment of license fees. This is not as
serious a conflict as it might first appear if the licensor, in turn, is
confident and can convince the licensee that it can keep up its pace
of development and will thereby be able to supply new or improved
technology to the licensee.
2. Right of Licensee to Extend Know-How Term.-In order to
solve the sometimes difficult impasse arising during contract negotiations about the duration of the license agreement, it may be
advisable to resort to the expedient of somewhat lower license fees
and a shorter term during which the licensor will promise to maintain the level of technology available to the licensee or to allow the
licensee access to its manufacturing facilities. At the same time, a
licensee may be given an option to extend the license for an additional term (e.g., five years). To date, there is insufficient experience to indicate whether socialist licensees will indeed renew the
term of a know-how and manufacturing technology agreement.
Considering, however, the great advances made in the last few
years by Western companies that are leaders in their field of industry and active in East-West licensing, we may assume that Eastern
European interest in Western, mainly American, know-how and
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technology will continue and that Eastern licensees will opt for the
extension of license terms.
H. Applicable Law
Until a few years ago Eastern European licensees refused to
agree on an applicable law provision; the refusal stemmed from a
reluctance on the part of the licensees to recognize the applicability of the licensor's law and a similar reluctance on the part of the
licensor to subject the license agreement to an Eastern European
legal system. As a compromise, agreements generally provided
that in case of arbitration, the arbitrators would apply equitable
principles, i.e. render their award ex aequo et bono.
In the last few years, however, the attitude of Eastern European
licensees has changed, and they are now prepared to stipulate that
a neutral country's law will govern the construction and interpretation of the license agreement. The Soviet Union, for example, prefers to provide for the application of Swedish law (The Soviets
frequently provide also for arbitration in Sweden). This choice
appears to be motivated more by ideology than a real preference
for the substantive provisions of Swedish law. Few if any of the
contracts containing choice-of-law provisions are negotiated by
attorneys familiar with Swedish law. Other Eastern European
countries are amenable to accept the application of the law of the
Swiss Confederation, with concurrent arbitration in Zurich or Geneva.
Until recently, American licensors were uncertain -whether a
contractual provision for Swedish or Swiss law, for example, would
be upheld in case of controversy since there is no nexus of any kind
between the designated countries and either the parties or the
license agreement itself. The United States Supreme Court's judgment in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. 31 seems to have
removed this uncertainty. Although Zapatainvolved a stipulation
of a neutral (English) forum in a contract between German and
American parties, the Court's strong preference for giving full recognition to the preference of contracting parties in the absence of
a clear violation of public policy would seem to be equally applicable to an agreement containing a choice-of-law clause. Thus, parties to a license contract may be reasonably certain that a contrac30. See J. GIFFEN, THE LEGAL AND
VIET UNION 191 (1969).
31.

407 U.S. 1 (1972).
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tual provision opting for a neutral governing law will be upheld by
American courts.
I. Arbitration
Arbitration has long been accepted as the preferred means of
settling disputes arising from international commercial contracts.
Such contracts are typically concluded among parties accustomed
to different legal systems and concepts, different languages and
commercial customs and indeed, even different societies. In our
context, the parties may even be unequal; a private individual or
corporation may be dealing with a state trading agency, a formidable opponent indeed in the courts of its own country. On the other
hand, socialist enterprises are not eager to accept the jurisdiction
of a capitalist court. Although objections to the status of arbitral
proceedings in East-West trade are voiced occasionally, arbitration offers the most efficient way to resolve disputes arising in the
course of East-West commercial relations. This efficiency has been
recognized not only in international conventions (discussed below)
but also in municipal legislation.13 The necessity and convenience
of arbitration in potential East-West trade disputes is well documented in legal literature.3 4 It is thus not surprising that arbitration clauses are found in practically all license agreements in EastWest trade.
The importance of arbitration has been stressed by the recent
Trade Agreement concluded between the United States and the
Soviet Union.3 5 Article 7 of the Trade Agreement encourages both
32. See Tangley, InternationalArbitration Today, 15 INT'L CoMP. L.Q. 719,
723 (1966).
33. See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND
LAW THROUGHOUT THE WORLD (Supp. 1964) (loose leaf); 3 P. SANDERS, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1965-1969. See also Act of Dec. 4, 1963, No. 98,
Concerning Arbitration in International Trade and Enforcement of Awards
(Czech.).
34. See, e.g., L. Kos-RABCEWICZ-ZUBKOWSKI, EAST-EUROPEAN RULES ON THE
VALIDITY OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 317 (1970);
Dietz, Foreign Trade in Hungary, 5 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POLICS 251 (1972);
Domke, ArbitrationBetween Government Controlled Bodies and Foreign Business Firms, 53 REPORT OF INT'L L. ASS'N 645 (1968); Domke, Recent Developments
in International Commercial Arbitration, 2 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POLITICS 267
(1969); King-Smith, Communist Foreign-TradeArbitration, 10 HARV. INT'L L.J.
34 (1969); Kleckner, Foreign Trade Arbitrationin Romania, 5 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L.
& POLITICS 233 (1972); Szaszy, Arbitrationof Foreign Trade Transactions in the
PopularDemocracies, 13 AM. J. CoMP. L. 441 (1964).
35. See 67 DEP'T STATE BULL. 595 (1972). For an excellent discussion of the
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the inclusion of arbitration clauses in United States-Soviet commercial agreements and the submission of disputes to arbitral tribunals in neutral countries. The Soviet Government can obviously
guarantee that their state trading agencies will comply with this
treaty provision by accepting the suggested arbitration procedure;
American corporations are free to reject the arbitration procedure
suggested by the Agreement 36 unless the parties fail to specify a
different procedure in their contract.
The Trade Agreement also calls for the application of the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Economic Commission for
Europe, 37 in spite of the fact that the United States was not a
signatory party and has not acceded to this Convention. These
rules should prove to be acceptable to American licensors. The
rules allow the parties freedom to appoint arbitrators, and only in
the event they fail to do so may a designated body or person appoint arbitrator(s) on their behalf or designate the presiding arbitrator. Contracting parties are also at liberty to designate a body
or person who is to appoint an arbitrator or the president of the
arbitral tribunal. Only if the parties fail to adopt the appropriate
appointive provisions will the "Appointing Authority" designated
in the Annex to the Rules make such an appointment.
A similar tendency toward the use of conciliatory arbitration
procedures in international commercial transactions may be seen
in all other socialist states. Arbitration clauses are almost always
included in contracts. Moreover, the Eastern bloc nations are
members of several existing international conventions dealing with
arbitration and the enforcement of arbitration awards. For example, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the
Soviet Union are members of the 1958 United Nations Convention
3
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Awards. 1 All of
Agreement see Starr, A New Legal Framework for Trade Between the United
States and the Soviet Union: The 1972 U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade Agreement, 67 AM.
J. INT'L L. 63 (1973).
36. Trade Agreement art. 7(a).
37. Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Jan. 20, 1966, U.N. Doc. E/ECE/625/Rev. 1, E/ECE/TRADE/81/Rev.
(1966). The Arbitration Rules were adopted pursuant to the European Convention
on International Commercial Arbitration, April 21, 1961, 484 U.N.T.S. 364.
38. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, Sept. 1, 1970, [1970] 3 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 3.
The Convention was signed (and ratified) by Bulgaria on December 17, 1958
(October 10, 1961); by Czechoslovakia on October 3, 1958 (July 10, 1959); by
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these countries are also members of the European Convention on
International Commercial Arbitration signed in Geneva on April
21, 1961.31 The tradition of adherence to such conventions has deep
roots: Czechoslovakia, Poland and Romania were among the members of the Geneva Convention and Protocol on Arbitration
Clauses of 1923;40 Czechoslovakia and Romania were among the
original signatories of the Geneva Convention on the Execution of
Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1927.1' Thus, there should no longer be
any question of the enforceability of a properly rendered arbitration award in any of the countries in Eastern Europe. The United
States has acceded to and has implemented the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958,12
and all Eastern European countries are signatories of, or have
acceded to, the same Convention.
III.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, one might note that, to date, American companies
have relatively little experience in licensing in Eastern Europe, a
fact attributable in large measure to American preoccupation with
strategic considerations during the Cold War era. With the arrival
of detente, American companies can be expected to catch up with
their Western European counterparts. Nonetheless, some Western
companies, especially American companies, still hesitate to explore fully a licensing arrangement with potential licensees in
Eastern Europe. One reason for this reluctance is that American
firms question whether divulging United States technology to
Eastern Europe will increase the Communists' ability to "bury"
the capitalist countries, ' la Khruschev. In answer to these fears,
Kenneth Rush, Deputy Secretary of State, speaking at the United
States Naval Academy in Annapolis, recently commented:
Poland on June 10, 1958 (October 3, 1961); by the U.S.S.R. on December 29, 1958
(August 24, 1960); and acceded to by Hungary on March 5, 1962, and Romania
on September 13, 1961.
39. See note 37 supra.The socialist countries were among the original signatories and they ratified the Convention as follows: Bulgaria, May 13, 1964; Czechoslovakia, November 13, 1963; Hungary, October 9, 1963; Poland, September 15,
1964; Romania, August 16, 1963; and the U.S.S.R., June 27, 1962.
40. Geneva Convention and Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, Sept. 24, 1923,
27 L.N.T.S. 157.
41. Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Sept.
26, 1927, 92 L.N.T.S. 301.
42. Act to Implement the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (1970).
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We would like to see more American businessmen begin to pursue
profitable business deals in Hungary as in Belgium; in Bulgaria as
in Norway; in Poland as in Uruguay. We encourage them to sell,
invest, and buy in these countries as opportunity permits and in
confidence that doing business in
Eastern Europe is fully consonant
43
with the U.S. national interest.
Reluctant potential licensors should also consider the views ex,pressed in November 1970 by Professor Ota Sik, Deputy Premier
and economic reformer under former Czech Premier Dubcek, before the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy of the Joint
Economic Committee of the United States Congress. After describing the drawbacks of the communist system, he noted that he was
still "an advocate for broadening and intensifying East-West relations to the greatest possible extent." He further stated that the
development of economic relations with Western countries will
"take the wind out of the sails of reactionaries and strengthen the
position and arguments of the liberal forces" in Eastern Europe.
He felt that East-West trade serves only to dramatize the inefficiencies of the economic systems in the Eastern European countries and the competitive limitations of their products in world
markets."

43. Dep't State Press Release, April 4, 1973.
44. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Economic Policy of the Joint
Economic Comm., 91st Cong., 2d Sess., at 1182 (1970).
Vol. 7-No. 1

